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USE OF DEADLY FORCE BY 
LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL 
DECEMBER 16, 1977 
San Francisco, California 
CHAIRMAN MEL LEVINE: These hearings will now come to order . 
My name is Mel Levine, and I•m the Chairman of the Criminal Justice 
Subcommittee on the reform of the Penal Code. To my far left is 
Assemblyman Paul Bannai who is the Chairman of the Assembly Crimina 
Justice Committee on Law Enforcement Specialized Training. I want to 
apologize to the people who have waited for this late start. The 
Chairman managed to miss his airplane in Los Angeles, but fortunately 
there was another one nearby so we aren•t that late, but I•m sorry to 
start a little bit late. 
Let me introduce the people who are here at this table for 
the benefit of any of you who do not know them. On my left between 
Assemblyman Bannai and myself is Patty Marchal who is Secretary to 
the Criminal Justice Committee, and on my immediate right is Peter 
Jensen, Consultant to the Criminal Justice Committee, and to my far 
right is Michael Ullman, Senior Consultant to the Criminal Justice 
Committee. 
This is the second of two joint hearings of the sUbcommittees 
on the Revision of the Penal Code and Law Enforcement Specialized Train-
ing dealing with the standards by which law enforcement personnel may 
or may not use deadly force. This is a thorny problem, and one which 
has confronted civilized society for hundreds of years. It requires 
the balancing of the high regard for the sanctity of human life with 
the need to enforee the laws of our communities in ordgr to Re~~t 
the citizens of this state to live without fear of abuse or a threat 
from others. 
without force situation, that is a serious felony, but no force was 
used such as with a little girl. 
We feel that the law currently has appropriate sanctions 
should an officer misuse deadly force by negligence or state of fact 
or by accident. The department that he works for, or he himself 
possibly, can be held civilly responsible. There are not that many 
instances that do occur, however. Also, the officer that should he 
through some other motive, whether it's a wanton, malicious act in 
an appropriate manner, there are criminal sanctions that do exist 
now, and certainly the District Attorney would prosecute and I know 
of no situations where they would not. The departments themselves 
would actively go after the individual with investigation. 
MR. MIKE ULLMAN: Captain Smith, do you know of any recent 
instances where the District Attorney has prosecuted police officers 
with misuse of deadly force? 
CAPTAIN SMITH: Mr. Ullman, I don't know of any currently, 
no. There was one in another state recently, I believe the State of 
Texas. 
MR. ULLMAN: There was a hearing in Los Angeles where it 
was actually brought up to the opposite point that the prosecutors 
don't prosecute and one of the reasons they don't prosecute is 
because of the law as being written in this general fashion that it 
would be very difficult to get a conviction. I just make that point. 
CAPTAIN SMITH: Mr. Ullman, I would think that an officer 
with premeditation used his firearm in a situation where he should 
not have used it, in other words, it's a homicide. That's what 
- -
we're talking about, murder, that the District Attorney would, in 
fact, prosecute. If he did not, certainly the public would go to 
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the grand jury which is on the judiciary side and have a grand jury 
investigation. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Excuse me, Captain, if I could interject 
at this point. I'm wondering whether the circumstances that we're 
concerned about are circumstances that really involve premeditation 
or if we're really trying to get at something that's a tougher ques-
tion. I think that I agree with you that if we have a premeditatio~ 
situation we have a likely prosecution situation, but one of the 
things that concerns me in holding these hearings and has started 
to concern me more after hearing the testimony in Los Angeles is the 
gray area where there's clearly no premeditation, but where the 
standards are such that the threshold at which the trigger can be 
pulled is lower than a tougher standard might require. If somebody 
is in a position to know that law enforcement officers are in a 
position to know when he is responding to a non-violent felon, that 
the statue under which he's operating allows him the right to pull 
the trigger, wouldn't he be more likely to pull the trigger than if 
the statute that he is operating within didn't allow him that right 
and required that he only respond with deadly force if he was dealing 
with a violent criminal? 
CAPTAIN SMITH: Yes, I would have to agree with you, but 
then we get into a new area, Mr. Chairman. The officer then would 
allow the felon to escape if it was not a violent felony. At the 
time we may not know that it was, in fact, a violent felony, we 
respond to a lot of calls. They're not violent when we get there. 
The suspect is fleeing. We do let them go. Some of our policies 
throughout the State of Califo~nia vary ~rom agency to agency, and 
we do let the individual fleeing get away. Then we find out later 
that a more serious crime has occurred. This is a difficult area. 
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CHAIRMAN LEVINE: I understand that, and you were referring 
to that in your earlier testimony, and what I'm wondering is, and I 
don't know the answer to this question, I'm wondering if there is 
some middle ground that we can take between on the one hand the 
statute that's been on the books since 1872, and perhaps on the other 
hand the Kortum case or something like that where the officer at least 
has to have some reason to believe, and I'm not sure that's the rele-
vant standard, but if there is some way to get at the possibility 
that a serious crime has been committed, something tougher than the 
statutory standardbut perhaps a little clearer and more helpful to 
the officer than the language in the Kortum case. I don't know how 
you'd arrive at that middle ground or whether you believe it's appro-
priate to try to do so, but that is something that concerns me, some 
of the reasons that are underlying some of these questions that I'm 
asking you. 
CAPTAIN SMITH: Yes, I would agree with you, Mr. Chairman. 
It certainly is not appropriate to shoot at a forger, for example, 
a woman who is fleeing and the officer couldn't catch her for some 
reason. Certainly that would be inappropriate. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: And I think Kortum tells us that's 
inappropriate, but the statute doesn't. The statute says that an 
officer can shoot at a forger. 
CAPTAIN SMITH: But in some cases you might want to. This 
is the problem. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: But in those cases, wouldn't you have 
some reason to believe the forger had also done something more serious 
as far as violence is concerned? Couldn't you try to work the statu-
tory language into defining those situations rather than just leaving 
it to the imagination of the officer? 
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CAPTAIN SMITH: Well, that sounds fine, and maybe it would 
be great if we could do it, but I think if we get a laundry list 
appointing one not to shoot in this situation, and then do we follow 
this little channel, yes or no, that type of thing, then we're going 
to put the officer in a position of jeopardy because he's trying 
to think of all of these things at the same time when his own life 
may be threatened or that citizen. 
I appreciate what you're saying, Mr. Chairman, to this 
problem. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: And I appreciate what you're saying. 
The other side of the coin, obviously, is where they were putting 
citizens in a situation of jeopardy when the criteria that is currently 
being applied allows for the use of deadly force in situations where 
it perhaps ought not to be used. 
CAPTAIN SMITH: It comes back to the same issue in certain 
cases it's left up to the judgment of the officer, and his good 
judgment comes back to his training that he's had. Officers are 
humanistic today. We do have psychiatric examinations for our 
officers, potential candidates. They are screened 6ut. In many 
departments, if officers begin acting strange, they are talked to, 
and well, I can speak within my own department, if we do have a 
problem, we have another way of handling it, getting the officer off 
the street, being talked to, things of that nature. Many departments 
do this. But I don't know of any officer today that personally would 
not use good judgment. It's a matter of trying to use that good 
judgment at the right time. 
-CHAIRMAN LEVINE: If I could leave that for a moment to 
the point that Mr. Ullman interrupted your testimony, and that was 
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the issue of the D.A.'s prosecuting. How would you feel about the 
method, a piece of legislation which would create a special prose-
cutor for the prosecution of uses of deadly force by law enforcement 
officers as opposed to having the D.A. be the prosecuting agency? 
CAPTAIN SMITH: And you're saying is a criminal prosecutor, 
but it depends where the criminal sanctions would lie. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Regardless of the statute now. Say, for 
the point of argument, say the statute stays the same, and we don't 
tighten up the standard at all, but we remove the prosecutorial 
function from the District Attorney to a special prosecutor's office 
which would be independent of the District Attorney's office, so that 
at least the theory would have it that you don't have an agency that's 
required to work so closely with law enforcement personnel on a day-
to-day basis whose independence might be compromised in prosecuting 
unlawful conduct regardless of what the statute was. 
CAPTAIN SMITH: Such as the Attorney General's office? 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Oh, some~hing further removed than that. 
The Attorney General's office would obviously be further removed 
than a local prosecuting agency but so an independent special prose-
cuting agency whose job was a variety of things including the prose-
cution of unlawful uses of deadly force by police officers. 
CAPTAIN SMITH: So long as they're qualified. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: You wouldn't have any problem with that. 
CAPTAIN SMITH: The FBI does that now also . I just wanted 
to make the point that if there are,criminal sanctions beyond what 
exists now would be placed. The officers are going to be very 
concerned in each situation, and I would suspect that many of them 
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are going to do as many citizens do today, turn their head, do nothing. 
They just don't want to become involved. With that you're going to 
find like a response in a sense of pro-active law enforcement in this 
state. Would there be an increase in crime, probably a lot of people 
that would have made good police officers would not want to come into 
the business, if there are too strict sanctions. As I've indicated 
before, if a doctor through mistake of fact, inadve~tance, something 
of that nature, puts an error in his practice, and ~he same with an 
attorney, they are handled in a civil area without any big problem. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: But the result normally from that type of 
negligence is not the loss of human life. 
CAPTAIN SMITH: In the medical situation, it could be. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Okay. And there are criminal negligence 
statutes in the event. Okay, I think that's fair, but in the event 
there is loss of human life, there is the possibil~ty of criminal 
prosecution. 
CAPTAIN SMITH: That's correct, yes. Certainly. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: I have one additional question. With 
I 
regard to your argument that if the standards become tougher th~t the 
officer is likely to disengage, get less involved. I'd just li~e to 
explore that for a moment. 
The Los Angeles Police Department recently has been guided 
by new regulations that were imposed by the L.A. Police Commission 
in response, as I understand it, to the Kortum case, and those regu-
lations basically tapped the Kortum decision. I don't know if you 
had an opportunity yet to review them because they are new, and they 
have only been in effect for a very short time, but I wonder whether 
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those regulations which really are meaningfully tougher than the 1872 
statute are likely, in your opinion, to create the same result as 
you•re talking about, the disengagement or uninvolvement of a police 
officer. 
CAPTAIN SMITH: Well, I haven•t seen the Los Angeles standard 
making reference to that to the officers becoming less involved, pertains 
to what criminal sanctions might be placed on them. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: But administration regulations are different. 
CAPTAIN SMITH: Yes, they•re totally different. The adminis-
trative regulations from that might be placed on the officer through 
statute. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: How does an officer view it if there is a 
way to generalize about administrative regulations vs. statutory 
proscriptions? Does an administrative regulation mean that much on 
day-to-day conduct if the officer won•t be as likely to respond to an 
administrative regulation as he will to a statute? 
CAPTAIN SMITH: No, he 1 ll respond. Generally, as far as I 
know from my own ~ience, they respond to the administrative regulation; 
if they do not, they can be suspended--that•s within my own department, 
of course--be suspended or even terminated. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: But they wouldn 1 t be as likely to sort of 
turn their back if the sanction weren•t a criminal sanction as they 
would if the sanction were a criminal sanction, is that what you•re 
saying? 
CAPTAIN SMITH: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Mr. Jensen. 
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MR. PETER JENSEN: Captain, could you briefly summarize 
for us the administrative regulations Oakland has for its officers? 
They are different from the state &atute, aren't they? They're more 
restrictive? 
CAPTAIN SMITH: Yes, they are. 
MR. JENSEN: Could you summarize those? 
CAPTAIN SMITH: Yes. We do not use our firearms for 
juveniles ell, the way it is now since the Kortum case? Or prior 
to the Kortum case? 
MR. JENSEN: Currently. 
CAPTAIN SMITH: Currently we're right down the line with 
Kortum. It's 
---------------------' and we will not shoot at moving 
vehicles and juveniles, ever known to be a juvenile. Again, unless 
an officer's life or another person's life is threatened. Unless we 
knew them to be violent at the time. Unless the juvenile is fleeing 
and the suspect is fleeing the vehicle. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: I'd like to explore just one other area 
with you. 
As I understand the thrust of your testimony with regard 
to your favoring the 1872 vs. a change, the principal concern is to 
allow the law enforcement officer enough leeway so that if he hasn't 
cooly committed a violent felony but still may be dangerous and has 
committed a felony, and it turns out later that he, in fact, has 
committed a violent felony and really is dangerous, you only give the 
law enforcement officer adequate leeway to go after that person, is 
that correct? 
CAPTAIN SMITH: That's correct. It's that latitude that 
we're seeking. 
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CHAIRMAN LEVINE: If a statute could be drafted which would 
give you that latitude, but would require that the officer use deadly 
force only in situations such as that, however they get defined, but 
defined to give you that latitude and otherwise to shoot only a 
violent felon as opposed to a felon without defining violent vs. 
non-violent what problem do you have with that type of change in t h e 
law? 
CAPTAIN SMITH: That's not a great problem, as long as there 
was not a longer list, which is of great concern to us. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Okay. I'm not sure that it can be so 
drafted, but I'm trying to get at the area that you have concern 
with. Thank you very, very much for your testimony. 
Our next witness is Ed Roybal! from the Central Legal 
de la Raza. 
MR. EDWARD ROYBALL: Ladies and gentelemen, members of the 
Assembly, I'm Edward Roybal!. I'm an attorney. I represent a family 
of a shooting victim in Oakland, California. And I'm here today to 
argue in favor for this notion which would be strict control in the 
use of firearms by police officers. 
I think I just should point out that I did not receive the 
packet from the committee, and so I did not have specific proposed 
legislation to address, but I would like to speak about the issue of 
police crimes, police looters, and the family I represent. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: May I interrupt you for one second and 
simply suggest this? If, after these hearings, you have the time 
to develop specific proposed legislation based upon your views, we'd 
very much appreciate r~ceiving that in writing, and would encourage 
you to do that. 
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MR. ROYBALL: The family I represent is but one example 
in the family which is separated as the result of police lawlessness 
and the unreasonable and unnecessary use of force by a police officer, 
and in this case as in so many others, the act of this police officer 
remains unchecked. There was not so much as a reprimand against the 
ofticer involved. What I'm ta!king about is police crime, not a 
shoot-out between police officers and armed criminals, but rather 
situations in which police have killed unarmed civilians, persons who 
were at most mere suspects. I'm talking about a pattern of police 
over-reaction, of police excessive use of force, harassment, intimi-
dation, a pattern which it primarily affects minority and low-income 
communities. Nothing has changed since 1968, when u.s. Commission on 
Civil Rights disclosed such a pattern as of finding the fact in its 
Mexican-Americans in the administration of justice in the Southwest. 
In fact, the statistics show that the incidence of police killings 
not only of Chicanos, but also against Blacks, Whites, and all persons 
in society had been on the rise in recent years. In Los Angeles in 
1975, 75 unarmed suspects were shot by police. Of these 47 are Black, 
18 Latin, and 10 were White. In the first 6 months of this year in 
1977, 28 more unarmed civilians were killed by police officers. In 
fact, in Los Angeles, 50% of all police shootings result in death, 
and that is a figure which is much higher than the national average 
which is somewhere below one-third. 
In Oakland, where I now work, within seven months of 1975, 
5 unarmed civilians were killed by police officers. I'd like to bring 
to your attention, too, the most blatant examples. On August 19th, 
Floyd Calhoun, age 23, who was a suspect in 23 deaths, fled from 
police in his car. His car wrecked, he ran to a street near 85th 
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in Oakland. Police cars blocked off the street and at least 15 
police were surrounding him when he was shot in the back, in the 
head and the legs. He was unarmed. 
Earlier that year, February 3, Mr. Esther, age 34. Mr. 
Esther was mentally ill and his family had gone to the Oakland Police 
Department for help. When the police went to his horne, Mr. Esther 
refused to allow him to enter. He would not leave the house, and 
policemen attacked with tear gas. The house caught fire. Mr. 
Esther lept out of the second story window, and he was killed by a 
volley of four shots. Also, in Emeryville, California in 1971, 
there's a case of Tyrone Geiten, a 14 year old boy. Three police 
officers pursued him as a suspect in a car theft. He was unarmed, 
14 years old. He ran down the street. Two of the three officers 
turned and fired. He fell and these officers then went up to his 
body and shot him again at point blank range, and he was unarmed. 
MR. ULLMAN: Are the police accounts of these shootings 
as you are stating them, or are they somewhat other than this? 
MR. ROYBALL: Okay. I do not know the official police 
account in the Tyrone Geiten case, for example. That case has been 
in litigation for about five years. There's been no action taken in 
the case, but that suspect was 14 years old, unarmed, and was fleeing. 
These facts are established. 
MR. ULLMAN: So what about in the Calhoun and Esther cases? 
Are the police accounts the same as you have stated? 
MR. ROYBALL: In all honesty, I do not know the police 
accounts. This information I received from other persons through 
their research, and I do not know the police accounts in those cases. 
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In both of these cases, to my knowledge, the incident never became 
an issue, and in fact in my capacity as an attorney I'm always learning 
of incidents of police shootings, police brutality. I attempt to follow 
up on these. In most instances, these instances die without so much 
as a report in the newspaper or any action by the police department 
or the persons involved. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Mr. Royball, how would a change in the 
law affect these situations, and what change in the law in general, 
even though you don't have specific legislation in mind, do you be-
lieve would be constructive, and what result would it accomplish? 
MR. ROYBALL: The problem is two-fold. In addition to the 
incidents of police accesses, and I guess the police motives are but 
an extreme example of other acts of police brutality which go on 
systematically, or at least are continuously occurring in the com-
munities. But there is also the problem of the unwillingness of the 
local police departments to police themselves, and I feel that the need 
for legislative control stems from this fact. As I mentioned in these 
five Oakland cases, there was no action against the officers involved. 
In the Barney Benevitus case, Officer Michael Cagney violated 
virtually every procedure established by the Oakland Police Department 
for one man felony car stops and also to the discharge of firearms. 
Step by step all the way down the line, Officer Cagney violated these 
procedures. Barney Benevitus was unarmed standing in a fixed position 
when Officer Cagney took a loaded and cocked shotgun and attempted 
to pat down, conduct a pat-down search and he shot him in the back 
of the head, literally blew his brains and half his head off at 
point blank range, and what followed then was not action by the 
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police department based on Officer Cagney's violation of procedures 
and the fact that a man was killed as a result, but rather a very 
obvious and blatant attempt by the Oakland Police Department to cover 
up the situation. Most notably a few days, I believe it was three 
days after Barney Benevitus was killed, the police department issued 
a statement to the press that since a felony had occurred Officer 
Cogney had merely followed routine procedures. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: What I don't understand from your testi-
mony is that if there is this type of local obstruction of justice 
going on, what type of state legislation would be of assistance in 
dealing with the problem? 
MR. ROYBAL: Okay. Specifically, I would urge regulations 
from the outside by the Legislature restricting the situations in 
which officers can use firearms and realistically, I am not talking 
about straight jacketed law enforcement or the legitimate concerns 
of law enforcement but there are many situations in which case after 
case show firearms have been used and I would, more than that, urge 
that these legislative controls be, in fact, enforced and I think 
that is more of the problem than anything. 
Also, the facts show that local district attorneys have 
not enforced statutes, criminal statutes, that stand now against 
police officers in the decade of the '60s - between 1960 and 1970, 
there were fifteen hundred killings of unarmed civilians. Only three 
resulted in any criminal sanctions against the officer involved. 
The Barney Benevitus case is another example and other cases with 
which I am familiar are examples of the fact that the district 
attorneys most often will not prosecute a police officer regardless 
-16-
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of the fact, regardless of how blatant the incident was, including, 
as in this case, the direct flagrant violation of procedures. In 
fact, following the Benevitus case, not only did the police department 
issue statements that procedures had been followed, they also said 
they found no grounds for disciplinary action whatsoever against the 
officer. It died right there in the police department. The district 
attorney in that case refused to prosecute the case himself. What he 
did was to convene the Alameda County Grand Jury to conduct two days 
of closed hearings, the transcripts of which are unobtainable, and 
the Grand Jury failed to indict. We cannot -- we can only speculate 
as to what happened inside, but I do know witnesses who testified, 
and I do know that the district attorney spent more time inquiring 
into the background of the victim than he did with the actual incident 
itself. Following the killing of Barney Benevitus, there have been 
repeated acts of harassment directed at the family. In each case, 
complaints have been filed with the internal affairs division of the 
police department. In every case, there has been no action taken. 
The most blatant of these incidents involved half a dozen officers 
appearing at the home of a man who was not an eyewitness but whom 
Barney Benevitus had stopped to visit when he was pulled over or stopped 
by Officer Cogney. Half a dozen officers appeared at 3:00 o'clock in 
the morning. His brother opened the door, they ordered him out, they 
had their weapons drawn, pointed at his head, they made mocking and 
taunting remarks about Barney's death. They threatened him when his 
brother also appeared, they repeated their threats and only when their 
mother appeared, who apparently they were not expecting to find, did 
they leave, but not before giving the brother involved a ticket for 
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spitting on the sidewalk. This was reported to the internal affairs 
division. Nothing happened. Others, just to pick one or two of the 
most blatant incidents, one of the sisters of Barney Benevitus was 
stopped allegedly for a dog leash violation, well, it was a warrant 
on a dog leash violation and she was stopped. She was arrested. 
She was searched by male officers who are not supposed to search a 
woman. She was detained for quite some time. Then she was driven 
to a parking lot where half a dozen patrol cars converged on the 
scene. She was searched again. She was threatened. She was put 
back into the patrol car, driven to another parking lot where the 
same thing happened again. This went on for 2~ hours before she was 
finally taken to the police department and booked. Again, nothing 
was done by the Internal Affairs Division by the Police Department. 
They certainly do not patrol themselves. 
This is why I feel there's a need for outside controls to 
control the excesses and the abuses. This is also the reason why 
there is a need for an independent prosecution and for someone who 
is responsible for and willing to vigorously prosecute these cases 
where the police do act in a lawless fashion and do commit crimes 
against people and do act with flagrant disregard for the rights of the 
people that are supposedly protected. 
' ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI: Mr. Roybal, evidently you're an attorney. 
You're saying outside groups. Would you think that the grand jury, 
and I am sure there are people that are chosen from this community, 
respectful people, and they fail to indict based upon facts which they 
collected which were not prejudiced by one side or the other, do you 
. -
think that that kind of a - decision that they reached was- not acceptable 
to you? Is that your opinion? 
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MR. ROYBAL: My response to that would be indictment of 
the grand jury system basically. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI: You'd do away with all grand juries 
then in the United States and say that there must be another system? 
What other system do you think you could get any better? 
MR. ROYBAL: Okay. In other words, the grand jury is an 
antiquated mode of criminal prosecution which is almost never used 
in over 99% of all cases. The District Attorney routinely conducts 
his own investigations. Upon determining that he has sufficient 
evidence, he files some information and it's followed by a preliminary 
hearing at which the issue is whether there is sufficient evidence 
to bind the defendant over for trial. The preliminary hearing is 
an open court. It's an adversary proceeding. Both sides are repre-
sented by council, and you do have an independent magistrate deciding 
whether there is sufficient evidence to bind the defendant for trial. 
In case of the grand jury, the proceeding is behind closed doors. 
The de~endant does not even have a right to know that the grand jury 
is being convened to consider charges against him. All testimony is 
presented by the District Attorney. The defendant has absolutely 
no input into it, nor does any outside interest have a right to be 
present. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI: Once you set up this other commission 
or whatever you're thinking of, do you think that you would get more 
input, or it would be better, or be unprejudiced or more likely to be 
evenhanded? Do you think that is the reason why you think a separate 
body? In other words, you have a suggestion. Who would you get? 
MR. ROYBAL: Okay. I would suggest an independent prosecutor 
or an independent office. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI: Who would be independent? One person, 
or just a group of people? Who would be independent? 
MR. ROYBAL: Something on the state level. It would be 
obviously more than one person. It would be an entire office, and 
I would assume a team of prosecutors. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI: Attorney General's office? 
MR. ROYBAL: For example, or an independent body established 
for this purpose. The issue of the problem which I am attempting to 
address is the failure of both police officers, police departments, 
and the local district attorneys to act in cases of police brutality. 
In the u.s. Commission of Civil Rights, the Congress of the United 
States, even the u.s. Attorney in Philadephia, Pennsylvania, have all 
sighted but they call a blindness to police brutality, and that these 
cases are not prosecuted, they are not acted upon. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: I would like, just for the record, to 
indicate that these hearings, as I assume you know, don't deal with 
the scope of the matters that you're testifying about. We're talking 
now, at least in this context, only about the issue of the use of 
deadly force by police officers, and we're trying to get a focus on 
whether or not there ought to be different legislation or any legis-
lation with regard to the use of deadly force. These other issues 
that go beyond deadly force are not really going to be dealt with 
by any of the legislation that will come out of these hearings, so 
to the extent you could confine your testimony to the issue before us, 
it would be helpful. 
MR. ROYBAL: Could I ask you, not only the discharge of 
firearms, but also the use of firearms and in which situations it 
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is permissible for an officer to use and draw weapons. By the use 
of the firearms, I find it would be clearly included within the issue 
of use of deadly force. 
MR. ULLMAN: I hate to go back on what you're just talking 
about after Mr. Levine was taking you away from it, but you're talking 
about police officers violating civil rights of other persons, and you 
seem to be fairly well convinced that the evidence against us is fa~ ~ly 
well documented. Has the FBI been brought into it? 
MR. ROYBAL: Yes. The FBI investigation in the Benevitus 
case began in June. Just last week I was in Washington, and that was 
the Justice Department, and was told the investigation will be expe-
dited and completed in the corning weeks. 
MR. ULLMAN: Well, do you feel that the FBI is providing 
protection that you're asking that some independent body, such as a 
special prosecutor or a state attorney general or whatever have you, 
because you're talking about flagrant cases, I believe, or violations 
of civil rights, and we're not talking about judgmental calls which 
is basically what this hearing is about. Do you feel that the FBI is 
providing the kind of protection that you're talking about? 
MR. ROYBAL: Well, in answer to your question, no, and in 
fact one of the first comments that Mr. G. Days made, head of the 
civil rights division in Washington, is that the FBI cannot go around 
policing incidents of police brutality every time the local authorities 
fail to take action to prosecute. And of course that is true. The 
answer to that would be to point out the very flagrant nature of the 
civil rights violation in this particular case, but it is true that the 
federal government cannot assume the role of policing the police. 
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That's why I'm calling for a body on the local level which will 
assume that function, given the unwillingness of the police to 
patrol themselves. 
Oakland? 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Do you have further testimony? 
MR. ROYBAL: That is basically all. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Do you have a police commission in 
MR. ROYBAL: There is no police commission. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Is there a local body in Oakland that 
does have jurisdiction, the so-called policing the police? 
MR. ROYBAL: There is none. The only body is the internal 
affairs division of the police department. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Thank you very much for your time and 
your testimony. 
Our next scheduled witness is Jermiah P. Taylor, Deputy 
Chief of Operations of the San Francisco Police Department. Chief 
Taylor. 
MR. JEREMIAH P. TAYLOR: Welcome. I'm unfamiliar with 
the format of your hearing. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Okay. Fine. What we are trying to get 
at, Chief Taylor, is basically whether or not the 1872 Statute which 
is on the books with regard to the use of deadly force by police 
officers, Penal Code Section 196, should be changed. 
We are looking at it in light of the Peterson and Kortum 
cases which addressed that issue directly in the courts in the past 
year, and we're interested in your thoughts on that sUbject. In 
particular, on anything related to it that you'd like to offer. 
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MR. TAYLOR: Well, I refreshed my memory on that particular 
section last night when I knew I was corning down here, and I see 
no need in San Francisco for any revision or change of it. We have 
a strict and close control of all of our operations in regard to the 
use of deadly force, and in fact, in the use of any force by any San 
Francisco policeman. I've been over the statistical material that 
bears on the subject, tnat is the amount of people in San Francisco, 
the cases that we're involved in with regard to arrest, and I'm talking 
about serious felony cases where violence or force could be used, or 
homicides, robberies, and/or aggravated assaults, and I find that in 
all those cases, and we made about 3,000 arrests this year, we've had 
to use force in le~s than 1% of the cases. This gets down to actually 
37 instances when our policemen were involved in the use of violence 
or deadly force, a pistol, and we find that our investigation of the 
incidents by the patrol force, myself, that is the hierarchy of com-
mand by our internal affairs bureau, that lays on an additional 
examination, by the inspector's bureau, that is our detectives that 
work in conjunction with and closely alongside of the district 
attorney's office, that we have no difficulty that way. 
So, as I say, we find we're under close control, and have 
no difficulty. 
instances 
1977? 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Can I ask you a question about those 
Have there been any deaths in those 37 instances in 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes. Of the 13 cases in which somebody was 
actually hit with gun fire, two suspects were killed, one po~i~e 
officer was killed, twoofficers were injured, and eight suspects 
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were injured, making a total number of thirteen cases in which there 
was actually a result or rather injuries as a result of police 
action. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Do you know whether those statistics are 
generally the same from year to year or whether there are any sig-
nificant changes from year to year? 
MR. TAYLOR: I think they were reduced about three years 
ago, and now they are consistently quite low. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Do you have any ideas as to why they were 
reduced? 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes. A concentration of effort on the part 
of the department with the implementation of a new gun control policy 
was no doUbt almost completely responsible for it. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: So that about three years ago, there was 
a new gun control policy in the SFPD? 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes. I have the date here exactly, if you'll 
give me a moment. It was in January of 1972 that we implemented our 
new policy and procedures with regard to the use of firearms throughout 
the department, and it was at that time we started teaching it basic-
ally to the recruits. We passed out information generally, and 
there was a complete education in the department in regard to their 
ability to use firearms and the restrictions thereon. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: How does that policy compare with Section 
196? 
MR. TAYLOR: Actually, this lies on the restrictive side 
of that particular section. In other words, we're more restrictive. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Can you summarize how you're more restric-
tive in San Francisco? 
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MR. TAYLOR: Well, I think that the requirements that can 
only be used in defense of himself when he has reasonable cause to 
believe that he is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily 
injury, is a little bit more restrictive, and this also applies to 
using it or utilizing the deadly force when some other person is in 
danger of death or of serious bodily injury, and the interpretation 
of the particular cases. And what we've done is we've gone through 
the criminal code and picked up those areas where our policemen are 
most apt to be involved with violence, and we specified specifically 
what it is that they can and can't do. 
For instance, under the section on burglarly, we tell them 
that they can't use force in the arrest of a burglar. "An ordinary 
burglary does not involve the use of force likely to produce death 
or serious bodily injury. Therefore, an officer would not be per-
mitted to discharge his weapon in attempting to apprehend a burglar 
unless he possesses information time he is required to act, that the 
burglar used force likely to produce death or great bodily injury or 
threatened to use such deadly force or perpetrate such great bodily 
injury. He should keep in mind that the right of self-defense 
always exists." As I say, we have these particular sections broken 
down with the specifics of what they can and can't do, and I feel 
that this is more restrictive. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Is it your understanding that that policy 
has, to all intent and purposes, been complied with since it's been 
enacted? 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes. 
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CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Has an argument been made internally to 
the effect that it has? 
MR. TAYLOR: There are arguments to that effect that this 
is inhibiting, and that officers, instead of corning up to the mine 
of legality back away in order to have a cushion, a safety, and this 
is probably true. However, I don't think it acts adversely on our 
operation to the extent that it needs changing. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Would there be any difficulty, in your 
opinion, in applying that type of a standard statewide? 
MR. TAYLOR: I can hardly see anything but think that it 
ought to be done if we're doing it here, and it's working, and it 
is, and I can testify to that. I can't see anything wrong with it 
being done statewide. I would recommend that it be done statewide. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: In the form of a statute? 
MR. TAYLOR: You're getting into areas of technical questions 
that I don't think I am capable of answering. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: The solution in the form of policy, you 
would recommend this as a statewide policy. 
MR. TAYLOR: I think that we have the finest policy that 
I am aware of, and as a consequence, for the safety of all why it 
would not be appropriate. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: And you have had good success with that 
policy? 
MR. TAYLOR: We have had very good success. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Thank you. Do you have any other tes-
timony or remarks that you care to give the committee? 
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MR. TAYLOR: I can only say, as I say, summing up what I 
have made comments about, and that is that our officers act without 
precipitation. They go forth deliberately. I've quoted the fact 
that we've been involved with 3,000 arrests here in San Francisco, 
and as a result of our training and of the policies that we have 
in effect, that there has been a miniscule amount of violence used, 
and I attribute this to the high quality of the policemen in San 
Francisco and to their training. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI: Are you under any kind of police 
commission in San Francisco today? How much influence do they 
have upon the rules such as you draw up there? Do they get involved 
in that, or is that something within the department? 
MR. TAYLOR: Everyone of the rules must be submitted to 
them, and they must pass it. They are the ones who actually imple-
ment or promulgate all rules in the police department and they, as 
I say, did on both this policy and on the rules and procedures, and 
I make that point that the policy is additional material bearing 
on what amounts to the rules or laws of our operation so that it 
widens it and enlarges it and gives them information. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Do they ever get involved in any of your 
internal doings? Let's assume that in this 37 use of deadly force, 
that there might have been a question relative to whether or not 
the police act in a right manner? Would the police commission be 
involved in that? Are they given any right to look into it? 
MR. TAYLOR: Any allegation of impropriety or failure 
or lack of, however you want to call it, any fault on the part of 
the police department ends up in the form of an investigation which 
th h d the Comml.'ssl.'on gets a copy of the entire the chief passes roug an 
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and complete investigation, and it's on the basis of their deter-
mination that the final--they're kind of like the top echelon. 
MR. ULLMAN: Chief, prior to 1972 when these rules were 
talked about, was there a widespread prediction within the police 
department that these new rules would not work, or would lead to 
not making arrests, predictions that it would just fail in general? 
MR. TAYLOR: There were comments to that effect. I don't 
want to say that they were--there were enough of them around. As 
I say, any change brings problems, comments, and unhappiness, but 
it went down smoothly and swiftly enough. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: And you think now generally that the police 
officers are satisfied with these rules on their conduct? 
MR. TAYLOR: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Chief, could I ask you if you could sUbmit 
a copy of those rules to this committee at some point? 
MR. TAYLOR: I will request of the Chief of the Department 
that you were rather well informed and have made this request, and 
I'm sure he'll send you one. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Thank you for your time and your helpful 
testimony. 
Is Mr. Walter Barkdull here? Mr. Barkdull from the 
California Department of Corrections, our next witness. 
MR. WALTER BARKDULL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members 
of the committee. Walter Barkdull, Department of Corrections, the 
State Department of Corrections. 
What I'd like to do this morning is take a moment of your 
time to describe briefly the role of the Department of Corrections 
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and how that differs from the general law enforcement operations 
about which you've already heard substantial testimony, also some of 
the problems created by the Peterson decision as we understand it 
and some specific solutions we think could be reached in that matter, 
plus perhaps a few miscellaneous comments on some of the prior testi-
mony. 
One of the big differences, of course, is that with a very 
minor exception we are not in the corrections end of it dealing with 
any question of innocence, and I would like to speak at some greater 
length about that, but a little later on. But on the other hand, 
they're not necessarily all felons either, so there is a problem 
in that respect. We have, as a department, basically two missions. 
One is the supervision of persons in the field, the parole opera-
tions and the other, of course, is the institutional phase of the 
correctional experience. I'll dwell only a moment on the parole 
end of it simply to say that there are 18,000 persons currently under 
supervision in California by approximately 500 officers of the 
department, all of whom are peace officers. They make several 
thousand arrests in the course of a year, but with some very small 
exceptions, the parole agents of the department are not permitted 
to be armed. We permit them to be armed only when they are the 
subject of a direct personal immediate threat, and as a consequence 
out of these more than 500 agents currently only three are armed 
and that, of course, is purely for purposes of self-defense. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Are they trained in the use of firearms? 
MR. BARKDULL: In the instances where they are committed 
to be armed, we insist that they have the POST approved firearms 
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training. We do not provide that training to the bulk of agents 
because, obviously, it would be unnecessary. 
Now, the institutional ~hase, I think, is where we run 
into the major problems in this area. We've got about 19,500 persons 
currently imprisoned in the state ~ti~utions. About 18,000 of those 
are convicted felons. The difference represents approximately 1500 
or so persons who are civilly committed as narcotic addicts, and a 
group generally runs around 500 miscellaneous category, probably 
the largest number of which are persons who have been convicted of 
an offense for which they could be sent to prison, and the court 
has elected to send them to us for a diagnostic study, 1203 P.C. 
study, z cases as they are called in the system. But they have them 
convicted but not sentenced, and I suppose some could be disposed 
of by the courts as misderneanants when that time arrives. 
In connection with the civil rights, it should be under-
stood also that 95% of those have been convicted of a felony in 
Superior Court, but the judgment has been stayed while the civil 
commitment has been exercised. There are, however, one or two 
straight-forward volunteers and there is a small percentage who are 
convicted only of misdemeanors. The Penal Code, however, says that 
that institution has to be treated in the same way as the state prison. 
The characteristics of the male felons who are committed to prison, 
I think, are also illuminating. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Excuse me. I don't know if your're about 
to get into this, but can you divide within the general felony cate-
gories vio~t and non-violent felonious convictions? 
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MR. BARKDULL: I can do it statistically, but I can't do 
it operationally. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Approximately statistically. 
MR. BARKQULL: Well, statistically, in fact I will give 
you the details. Statistically of the male felons, 58.9% of those 
in prison at the end of this last June were there on what I would 
describe as a crime of violence. Homicide, robbery assault, or 
rape. The percentage is slightly smaller for the female felon 
offender, 41.1%. 
We get less than 15% of those persons who are convicted 
in superior courts and could be sentenced to prison. Now, the other 
85% roughly are dealt with by diversion into probation, or probation 
in jail, or into the narcotic effort and smaller amounts into the 
Youth Authority and the Department of Health. So we're only getting 
15% or less of those convicted. And this, of course, is an adverse 
kind of screening process that results in the high proportion of 
those that we receive being in for homicide over the system as a 
whole. Of the men, almost 18% are in on a conviction of homicide, 
somewhat over 18% of the women in the system are there on a convic-
tion of homicide. Robbery runs in the men around 28%, 16% females, 
assault is about 7.9 and 5.6. Rape around 5.2 among the males, 
and .2 among the females. We do have one woman currently convicted 
of rape in the system. 
On other thing besides these formal commitment offenses, 
we have looked into the background of others received, and due to a 
variety of circumstances with which you're familiar in the criminal 
justice system, many of the others are actually--the conduct was a 
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violent offense which for one reason or another has typically been a 
violent offense reduced to a burglarly instead of being prosecuted 
as a rape or robbery or something of that kind. And others do have 
violence in their background, so we•re dealing with a volatile and 
dangerous population, but they•re not all convicted felons. 
Now, how do we control the people who are sent to us? The 
biggest method, the most significant method, I think, is a class-
ification of the inmates. We have 12 institutions, 15 or 18 minimum 
security camps. They range from the maximum institution at Folsom 
where there are walls and armed perimeter inside cells, interior 
gun rails, et cetera, to the camps which really have no perimeter. 
There•s a couple of signs out there that say this is off-limits or 
out of bounds, and that•s about the extent of it. And then we have 
more than 3,000 of these 18,000 felons in minimum security at this 
time. Obviously, this concentrates the more dangerous individual 
in the more secure institutions and conversely place~ those convicted 
of less serious crime~generally speaking, in the less secure insti-
tutions where we do not have an armed perimeter and we don•t get 
into the problems the committee is concerned with. But at DVI, 
the Deuel Vocational Institution, The California Medical Facility, 
the California Mens• Colony, the central facility at Soledad, 
Folsom, and San Quentin, every fourth or fifth person that you 
encounter in the yard there has been officially convicted of a 
homicide ranging 20-25% of them. 
The other big method of control is personal interraction 
between the staff and the inmate body. 85% of our officers serve in 
unarmed assignments. I 1 m speaking strictly of the peace officer 
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personnel at this point, the correctional officers and their super-
iors, and none of those who are down in contact with prisoners, of 
course, are ever armed except under some extreme emergency, and 
even then we try to avoid that. So it's a lot of control by personal 
interraction. 
We do have over the three shifts that it takes, of course, 
to operate an institution, about 13% of the uniformed staff in armed 
posts. That amounts to about 550 employees, and we do have for their 
guidance a written policy as to the use of firearms. It's a conser-
vative policy. If I may, I'll just read it here because it's brief. 
This is from the Department of Corrections• .. rules of the Director. 
"The greatest caution and conservative judgment must be 
exercised when using firearms. No employee will be assigned to 
carry or use a firearm who has not received departmentally approved 
firearms training. Institution firearms are only to be used when 
absolutely necessary to prevent escapes, assaults, or disorders. 
Before aiming a shot at any inmate, a warning must be given by 
shouting, blowing a whistle or firing a warning shot into the air 
or in a safe direction in keeping with the surroundings. When it 
is necessary to direct shots at an inmate, they will be aimed to 
disable rather than kill." Each institution must maintain a per-
manent chronological record, et cetera. 
You will note that this policy does differ to some extent, 
I think necessarily so, from that policy that has been presented 
this mroning, and as I understand, at your Los Angeles hearing. 
One of the differences, of course, relates to the restriction to 
violent felonies, and again as I progress through here I want to 
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comment on that a little more, but the simple fact as you elicited 
by questioning earlier, once they're in the system, and in certain 
places there may be high probabilities, but there is no way that 
the officer on the wall or in the tower can tell what the basis of 
the conviction was. 
The other difference is in the use of warning shots which 
we employ frequently. I can understand that the institutional thing 
is a great deal different than what you would be doing on a busy 
street, but we use them very frequently. We use, even as a matter 
of fact, blanks, quite frequently, as a warning shot, or frequently 
that's all it takes. We do have another difference, I think, that the 
police officer does not generally have, and that's the capability to 
the circumstance, and we lean heavily in the direction of the less 
lethal weapon. We do use tear gas on occasion. We use blanks 
as I've mentioned. We use something called, I guess, it's trade-
marked, but it's a stun gun--it shoots a thing like a bean bag out 
and while it may incapacitate the person, it doesn't break the skin 
or that sort of thing. We've used weapons that fire wooden pellets, 
and on some occasions some kind of plastic. Again, these are far 
less lethal than the normal kind of weaponry. And we do, by policy, 
have a specific set of weapons that are employed throughout the 
department. We have shotguns, but bird shot is probably the most 
frequently loaded in connection with that. 
MR. ULLMAN: Is there an average range at which you 
generally have to shoot? 
MR. BARKDULL: Taking it as an average, yes. It's probably 
somewhere around 150 yeards, somewhere in that vicinity. But this 
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varies tremendously. I guess what I'm really saying is the maximum 
distance is perhaps 200 from any particular armed post. We do 
issue a rifle, which is a small caliber rifle with a fairly small 
projectile, and the training for these requires a semi-annual quali-
fication on a POST approved course including explanations of the 
policy, and when to use the weapon, that sort of thing, safety with 
the weapons, and the actual firing of them. We use the weapons, 
of course, to prevent escapes or to capture people who have escaped 
to prevent or halt assaults, and to prevent or halt riots. Inci-
dentally, in the rare occasions when this may result in a fatality 
under existing statutes, this is automatically a coroner's case or 
there is an outside independent investigation of any fatality that's 
involved. 
Now, as we understand the court decision ••• 
MR. ULLMAN: What is the status of the current law on using 
deadly force to disburse a riot within a prison? Is that covered 
under 196? 
MR. BARKDULL: We believe that it is, yes, and I think 
that's something that we have to watch carefully in the process, 
how you define a riot, et cetera. 
MR. ULLMAN: Riot traditionally is a misdemeanor. Is 
there a special felony statute that covers riot within a prison, 
or is that dispute an attempt to escape? 
MR. BARKDULL: I can't give you a direct answer on it, 
Mike. It's regarded, I think, as a prelude to an assault. 
MR. ULLMAN: And this underscores my second question. Do 
you feel that the prison situation should not be covered by the same 
1872 statute that covers the line officer on the street? 
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MR. BARKDULL: No. We have no problem with the existing 
statute. 
MR. ULLMAN: Even though you're demonstrating that the needs 
within prisons are quite different. 
MR. BARKDULL: Yes. I think we have no problem with the 
statute as it stands currently, or with the Government Code as it 
relates to liability. 
MR. ULLMAN: You would have problems if someone interpreted 
a riot within the prison as being non-felonious conduct. 
MR. BARKDULL: Yes, we would. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: I assume you also do have a problem with 
Kortum and Peterson as it applies to prisons. 
MR. BARKDULL: Yes, we do sir. And as we understand it, 
the decision overreaches the argument that Mr. Finch proposed both 
to the court and to the committee in that the decision at least 
seems to change not only the tort liability that I got that he was 
seeking to have changed, but also defense against criminal charges, 
and we would suggest that this causes not only the problem that 
Mr. Ullman raised, but whether the language of Peterson speaks to 
an atrocious, violent felony, and from past decisions in relation 
to the felony murder rule, et cetera, we doUbt that escape could 
be considered an atrocious, violent felony unless it were accompanied 
by some other action other than the escape itself, and the problem of 
assaults is a very real one. It's really impossible down in a prison 
yard, a fight breaks out, people are milling around. You can't tell 
whether the combatants are armed until somebody is gravely wounded, 
and it's been our policy to try to break up something of that sort. 
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Now obviously we don't want, because of this decision, to 
subject the employees to some kind of criminal homicide charges, 
and we certainly don't want to place them in a position where some 
punitive personal liability might ensue. On the other hand, we 
feel a duty to protect the inmates and the staff because that's 
how you can have those unarmed persons down there backed by others 
who are; so what we would suggest, as our solution to the problem, 
would be for the Legislature to, by resolution I think would be 
appropriate, to reaffirm that the Legislature meant what it said 
when it said that deadly force could be used in connection with 
any felony. 
Now I recognize from the testimony this morning that that 
may cause you a problem in connection with things on the street, 
and I guess we'd have to suggest alternatively there should be some 
special provisions, some special defenses in relation to the prison 
situation. Otherwise you have anomalousness, and I would think 
ridiculous the situation of people escaping with impunity or not 
only with impunity, if they got hurt in the process, being compen-
sated by the state, perhaps. 
Basically, we feel that if the Peterson circumstances were 
allowed to stand so far as they applied to the prison situation, 
that it will badly cloud our ability to respond to immediate life 
and death kinds of situations, and that kind of immediate response 
is vital to the safety of the inmates and the staff, and to the public 
as well. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: In light of who you're representing, your 
concern I take it is primarily, if not exclusively tn this testimony, 
with regard to prison situation. 
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MR. BARKDULL: Yes sir, that's correct . 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: So that if we were to draft legislation 
which provided a special defense for prison situation or exempted 
a prison situation, and made clear that in those circumstances the 
1872 law applied, you'd be okay as far as your specific concerns? 
MR. BARKDULL: Yes, I believe that we would. Other than the 
possibility that Mr. Ullman raised. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Right. Do you have statistics at your 
disposal with regard to the number of shootings or deaths that have 
taken place in the California prison system of a relevant time 
period? 
MR. BARKDULL: Yes, I have them here with me. We went over 
it for an 18 year period, and there were 12 fatalities. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: During the 18 years? 
MR. BARKDULL: Yes, and of those 12, five occurred in the 
attempt to escape, five occurred in the midst of a direct assault 
by the victim, and two were in the nature of disturbances. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: What about the other six? 
MR. BARKDULL: No, that should add up to 12. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: I'm sorry, that's right, 12. What were 
the 18 years? 
MR. BARKDULL: Up to the present. I think it was 1963 
that statistics were started. Actually it measures from 1960. I'm 
sorry, the first fatality in that period was in 1963. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Has there been any period in which there 
were a number of fatalities, or have they been spread out over the 
time period? 
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MR. BARKDULL: Generally speaking, they were spread out 
over the time period with the exception of an extremely unfortunate 
incident in 1970 in which three persons were killed in one operation, 
so to speak. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Was that an escape attempt? 
MR. BARKDULL: No, that was an assault by one group of 
prisoners on another group of prisoners in the adjustment center 
exercise yard at Soledad. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: And these 12 fatalities are statewide for 
this entire period here? 
MR. BARKDULL: Yes. Incidentally, in the period during 
which those occurred, more than 105,000 persons were committed to 
prison. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Have your rules changed at all with 
regard to the use of force during thos 18 years? 
MR. BARKDULL: I don't believe that they have changed to 
any appreciable sUbstantive degree. They have changed because we 
had to go under the Administrative Procedures Act and things of that 
sort in that intervening period so there have been different numbers 
on them, and probably somewhat different wordings. 
~ MR. ULLMAN: Are there any changes in director's rules, or 
institutional rules based on the class of custody at the institutions? 
For instance, at a minimum security camp, are they the same rules for 
use of force to prevent escapes as there are at Folsom? 
MR. BARKDULL: I believe, Mr. Ullman, that the rules are the 
same, but the practical circumstances are vastly different. At San 
Quentin or Folsom you have an armed perimeter, you have gunmen on 
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the rails there and inside, et cetera. At the minimum security 
facilities you have no such armed perimeter. The camp, for example, 
if there is something to escape to, the lieutenant has to go some 
distance, usually to his horne, and there he has a .38 revolver that 
he can provide himself. 
MR. ULLMAN: Is it the policy of the department to use 
deadly force to prevent escape at minimum security institutions? 
MR. BARKDULL: No, it would not be. 
MR. ULLMAN: I have another question. Do you have advice 
of the Counsel or advice of the Attorney General as to Kortum and 
Petersen affecting your department? 
MR. BARKDULL: We have discussed it with our own counsels. 
To the best of my knowledge we have had no advice from the Attorney 
General in that respect. 
MR. ULLMAN: And do you have any conclusions as to whether 
or not the department is going to regard it as applying to them? 
MR. BARKDULL: We do not now regard them as applicable in 
its current status. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Thank you very, very much. 
Our next witness will be Harold Snow, the Executive Director 
of the Peace Officers Standards and Training Post. 
Is Steve La Plante here, San Francisco Sheriff's office? 
MR. STEVE LA PLANTE: I'm what is called the jail ombudsman 
for the City and County. It's a German word and means mediator, and 
I handle grievances and resolve disputes in the jails and in the 
Sherif~·-~ Depar~rnent. I am a criminologist by background, and I am 
a civilian, not a peace officer. I'm also the team leader of the 
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of the Sheriff's Department Crisis Negotiating Unit which will 
become relevant in a minute. 
What I want to address my comments to is specifically to 
situations wherein a suspect is contained, where you have a situation 
of an armed suspect who may or may not have assaulted somebody but 
who is not fleeing, who is contained and surrounded by peace officers. 
That's what I'd like to talk about. As you probably knew, in the 
Fall of '72, the New York City Police Department developed a hostage 
negotiator unit, and it was January 20th of '73 that it was used 
for the first time in which trained negotiators dealt with the hos-
tage situation in Brooklyn. It was successfully concluded and no 
hostages were killed. Since that time, it spread throughout the 
country. As a matter of fact, the San Francisco Police Department 
started it in 1974. What we have in the Sheriff's Department is based 
on the concept of negotiating, where hostages are taken, and to develop 
a situation where whenever there's a major crisis in our department, 
whether it be in the jails or on the streets, in a sense of an 
addition, for example, that it be our policy to negotiate first and 
only to assault when that would have failed. 
Now what I'd like to explain is that what happens now with 
hostage teams is that they are also used whenever the situation of 
a barricaded suspect, where there may not be a hostage, but just a 
suspect in a room who has a weapon and locked in. What we feel and 
what the administration of the San Francisco Sheriff's Office feels, 
is that it should be the policy of every agency in California, peace 
officer agency, to take the postion if there's a contained situation 
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to negotiate first, to attempt to negotiate, and only if that fails, 
to assault. You see a lot of agencies take the position that the 
SWAT special weapons tactics teams are called out, they set up a 
perimeter, they get out the bull horn, they say you got five minutes, 
and you don't come out, they throw in tear gas, and wait for it to 
settle and then they storm. Well, we think that's a very antiquated 
notion of doing police work. We feel that it should be the position 
of every agency that at least an attempt is made to negotiate first 
with the suspect. Oftentimes the suspects are engaging in an elabor-
ate form of suicide, and they cannot kill themselves, and they want 
somebody like the police to kill them for them. Sometimes they are 
simply caught in the act of a crime, or they are caught in the act 
of being out in the streets with a weapon, and quite often they are 
mentally disturbed. I'm not sure how you would translate that to 
legislation, but what we would like to propose is that you seriously 
consider if that's possible to the extent that it would apply to all 
the law enforcement agencies in California. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: That we seriously consider requiring 
negotiation first, is that what you're saying? 
MR. LA PLANTE: Right. Now let me explain that it's 
possible to draw that up in such a manner, and we'd be happy to give 
you a few documents that I didn•t bring, to really clarify what 
situations would entail negotiating, and which ones wouldn't. 
Generally speaking, what we feel is this. If once an 
attempt were to be made to talk to the suspects with a hostage 
taker and after that attempt was made the person was to do any 
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harm or to hurt anybody, we would suggest that negotiations cease 
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and you assault. However, in a situation where, let's say the 
homicide or the serious assaults inflicted, in the heat of the 
beginning of the situation where anxiety levels are high, that 
you retreat and wait a few minutes and try to negotiate after you 
have set up a perimeter. We do not advocate the abolition of SWAT 
teams. We do not advocate a statewide unit or regional units. We 
think it should stay within the local purvue. We feel there should 
be specially trained teams but we feel that SWAT teams should work 
in conjunction with negotiator teams. As a matter of fact, the 
latest thing we are doing in the sheriff's and police department 
is undergoing joint SWAT negotiator training sessions where we'll 
set up a situation and then negotiate it and try to resolve it. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Mr. Ullman. 
MR. ULLMAN: Why do you think this has not been widespread 
in California, after the New York experiment and, apparently it 
received a lot of pUblicity with the police agencies, why is there 
hostility towards this in the police departments, if there is any? 
MR. LA PLANTE: Basically, particularly in the last year 
and a half, the main form of hostility has really dissipated. It 
was the kind of a change that just took a few years to take effect. 
Where you have hostages, I don't think there are very many agencies 
left in California that wouldn't try to talk first. What I am 
talking about specifically is where you don't have a hostage, where 
you can contain a suspect, most agencies will get out their sharp-
shooter teams in position, go green light, which means that when 
they have a chance to shoot, they will, and that will take care of 
it. We are saying that even in those situations there should be a 
policy of trying to negotiate first. 
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MR. ULLMAN: And you believe that policy should be 
statewide? 
MR. LA PLANTE: Yes, definitely. 
MR. ULLMAN: Who are you representing? 
MR. LA PLANTE: I am representing the department here, 
the acting sheriff, Jim Denman, has authorized me to say this. 
It would have been the same thing. The previous sheriff would 
have said it if he'd been here. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI: May I ask a question? 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Yes, Mr. Bannai. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI: You indicated that you are a jail 
ombudsman, is that what it is? 
MR. LA PLANTE: Right. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI: If somebody is in jail and feels 
that there is undue force in retaining him or, shall we say 
brutality, do you listen to his case, is that your responsibility? 
Do you have many of those in San Francisco? 
MR. LA PLANTE: Actually, quite frankly, since the time 
that Sheriff Hongisto first took in, we have had a tremendous 
decrease in those things. In the last year, you can count them 
on one hand. I handle some very traditional working-condition, 
living-condition type grievances. I am also on call and respond 
whenever there is a crisis, such as a potential disturbance or 
an actual disturbance in the jail. 
CHAIRMAN BANNAI: I meant to ask the chief when he was 
here, but maybe you can answer it. In Los Angeles, you know we 
have lines of debarkation and jurisdiction of the sheriff and 
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the city police because we have city and county lines. Since you 
are a county and a city of San Francisco, what jurisdiction do you 
have as far as the sheriff's department and the police department? 
Does one write tickets on the street and the other one somewhere 
else? 
MR. LA PLANTE: The San Francisco Sheriff's office handles 
all of the jail duties for the city and county jails, including the 
booking facility. About 85% of our duties concern the jails. We 
also have the baliffs and the courts and a small civil division 
that executies civil writs. The police department has complete 
police duties on the streets. So our sheriff's deputies do not do 
any patrol, do not work on the streets in the police capacity. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BANNAI: So they make the arrests and then they 
hand the jurisdiction of that person over to you at the jail? 
MR. LA PLANTE: Right. So we have all of the jails. But 
even in this case, as you know, we do get some controversial evic-
tions that are difficult. As a matter of fact, in the case of the 
International Hotel, our six-man squads went in, five of whom were 
unarmed. Although in uniform with an empty holster, one of the 16 
members had a gun, and our policy and procedure with regard to that 
eviction, had we met any armed force, was that the deputies would 
have retreated, and we negotiators would have gone in to attempt 
to negotiate. I think that many other agencies in California would 
have handled that differently. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Does your experience enable you to reach 
any conclusions as to whether or not the Kortum and Peterson inter-
pretations of the use of deadly force statute should be applied 
statewide? 
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We have not formally studied this issue, and therefore 
do not have a formal policy, but I would like to make just a few 
observations. One of them is that my background and experience 
has been that of a pUblic prosecutor in Alameda County, and I've 
heaxrl sane of the witnesses testify about police shootings in 
Alameda County, in Oakland in particular, and I would just like 
to make the observation that the testimony I've heard has been so 
contrary to my own personal experience in Alameda County that I 
find it to be somewhat incredulous. With reference to police 
shootings in that county, we had a number of cases that I can 
recall. One of them involving police officers that got drunk one 
night and shot up a Black Panther headquarters. The District 
Attorney did charge them. They were tried, they were convicted, 
they did go to jail. 
Another case involving a police officer who got drunk and 
got into an automobile accident and hurt a person under circumstances 
that we felt amounted to criminal negligence. He was charged. The 
Geiten case that reference was made to, involved an Emeryville 
police officer who was charged with killing a young man by the name 
of Geiten, who apparently was escaping from a burglary. There was 
conflicting testimony in that case as to whether or not he was armed. 
Every witness that could be found was brought to the grand jury and 
testified in front of the grand jury. The grand jury concluded that 
there was not probable cause to believe that the officer had violated 
the law. 
We had another case in Berkeley, involving a police officer 
-
who was allegedly abusing a prisoner. That case was charged, it was 
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tried, the jury acquitted him, but I think in terms of any reluc-
tance on the part of the D.A., at least in that county to prosecute 
police misconduct, that he should not be concerned with it because 
I don't think it exists. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Tom, can I ask you a question? At the 
hearing in Los Angeles on Monday, one of the suggestions that was 
offered, and it was offered on behalf of the State PUblic Defender's 
Office, was that a special prosecuting office be established in 
order to prosecute improper use of deadly force by police. The 
argument that was made essentially was that the D.A.s have to work 
so closely with the police on a day to day basis, that it is just 
difficult for a D.A.'s office to be put in a position of having to 
prosecute people that they're going to have to rely on to prepare 
their own cases the next time around. Do you think there's anything 
to that argument? 
MR. CONDIT: Well, I think it will require the D.A.s to 
make hard choices, but I think D.A.s have a pretty exemplary record 
of making hard choices. I don't know exactly what the position the 
D.A.'s association would make on that issue. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: But in your experience I take it your 
testimony is that you haven't seen a problem as far as D.A.s 
prosecuting peace officers in Alameda County. 
MR. CONDIT: No, I haven't seen a reluctance to do so 
when I felt the evidence warranted it, and when I was in Alameda 
County we had a policy in any instance where a police officer had 
shot someone, we sent out to one of our investigators and we sent 
out an attorney to conduct an investigation at that time to 
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determine whether there was any evidence which would suggest that 
criminal charges ought to be brought, and if there were, they were 
brought. 
MR. ULLMAN: Did I understand that you said that the 
District Attorney was involved in investigating every police shoot-
ing or every police killing? 
MR. CONDIT: In Alameda County the D.A.'s office was 
involved in investigating every police killing. 
MR. ULLMAN: And so it wasn't strictly handled by 
Internal Affairs? 
MR. CONDIT: No. 
MR. ULLMAN: Let me ask you a question. You heard Mr. 
Roybal! testify. Now I say you're responding to that. His per-
ception of the grand jury proceedings in the Geigen case is obviously 
different than what you've testified was presented before the grand 
jury. 
Do you feel that this should maybe be some other apparatus 
to investigate these shootings where the information is made pUblic? 
I know the other balancing factor is dragging an officer's name 
through the pUblic records, but obviously the secrecy of the pro-
ceedings has just led to suspicion by Mr. Roybal! that either the 
right witnesses weren't presented to the grand jury. Do you have 
any comment on that? 
MR. CONDIT: Well, I think the grand jury being the 
cross section of the community was an appropriate form to bring the 
case in front of, and I had spent some time with Chuck Herbert who 
was the prosecutor in that case, and I know from talking to him that 
-so-
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
a 
he made a conscientious effort to bring in front of the Grand Jury 
every bit of evidence that his investigation could uncover. 
MR. ULLMAN: Of course, again the problem other people 
perceive that the grand jury only knows what the District Attorney 
brings before it, and obviously Mr. Roybal! has the impression that 
not all evidence was brought before it which may or may not be fault. 
MR. CONDIT: Well, I'm not sure whether a public hearing 
would have satisfied Mr. Roybal!. 
MR. ULLMAN: You may be right. 
MR. CONDIT: I have no further comments than what the 
committee does. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: We will reconvene the subcommittee 
hearings and ask Harold Snow if he would testify at this time. 
MR. HAROLD SNOW: Mr. Chairman, and committee members. 
My name is Harold Snow, and I am senior consultant, Commission on 
Peace Officers Standards and Training, and I'm here representing 
our Executive Director, Bill Garlington, who was the person invited 
to speak. The POST Commission has a very, very narrowly defined 
role as you know in law, and our primary purpose for existence is to 
set training and selection standards for California peace officers, 
and seldom do we stray from that unless the Legislature has given 
direction to do so. The Commission has, in the past, had opportunity 
to take positions on matters dealing with guns and use of deadly 
force, but it has refrained from doing so primarily because it was 
felt that that is something that should be left to other organiza-
tions and particularly the Legislature because it's a matter of public 
polic-y. I will -though- provide you with· some comments and some other 
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In the apprehension of persons suspected of being in-
volved in a crime where a firearm was used, 75% said "yes" and 9% 
said "no". 
In the defense of an officer, 96% said "yes". 
In the defense of others, 95% said "yes". 
As warning shots, 88% said "no" and only 6% said "yes " . 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: What was the question? 
MR. SNOW: As warning shots. Do you favor? And the 
overwhelming majority disfavors the use of warning shots. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Disfavors? 
MR. SNOW: Right. 
Another question, should a firearms use policy include 
specific instructions on the use of firearms, where it is known 
that a juvenile is involved? The answer there is 54% said "yes" 
and 34% said "no". 
Does your department have a system established to deter-
mine the facts in each incident involving the discharge of firearms 
by and officer? 89% said "yes" and 10% said "no". 
And the other questions relate to off-duty use of fire-
arms. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Could we have a copy of the complete 
results? 
MR. SNOW: Yes. The entire thing, I'll provide that. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: If the statute were to change and, say, 
were to change in the Kortum-Peterson direction, would your training 
change procedures? 
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MR. SNOW: Most definitely. We would change now and be an 
existing basic academy, but we undertake undoUbtedly a program to 
retrain all existing 43,000, well, in this case, 80,000 peace offi-
cers, because you're talking about all peace officers in California. 
Some 80,000 peace officers would have to be retrained in the sUbject. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Have you given any thought to how the 
training would be changed, what retraining or what difference in 
training would be necessary? 
MR. SNOW: We would not only have instruction on the 
change of law, but we would develop situations and much of our in-
struction has gone to performance objective instruction, where we 
get down to specific example, where we would ask them, based upon 
the instruction on the law, you know give them situational kinds, 
and then determine whether they would shoot or not shoot. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Do you have any reason to believe that 
standards and training couldn't be developed which would enable law 
enforcement to deal with a Kortum-Peterson standard as effectively 
as law enforcement currently deals with an 1872 standard? 
MR. SNOW: I would say that the training would be longer, 
there would be a more complex kind of instruction than now as currently 
exists because the standards would be more restrictive. I would say 
it's not impossible. We could develop training programs to meet 
more restrictive standards. 
MR. ULLMAN: Mr. Snow, let me ask you a question. In your 
survey of 1974, it appears that 34% or so of the responding police 
chiefs felt that use of deadly force should be utilized in felonious 
death offenses, and currently, I think the thinking is about 85% 
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adopting the CPOA standards. What's caused the change? Do you 
have any idea? 
MR. SNOW: Well, I think we ' ve evolved in California from 
previous times where we had different thinking, different community 
standards, less pUblic acceptance of use of deadly force, and the 
law enforcement is a reactive responsive kind of ••• 
MR. ULLMAN: Let me ask you another question. I'm just 
asking your personal opinion. Do you think that the policy decision 
as to whether or not the peace officers should be able to use deadly 
force and non-dangerous offenses should be a policy decision made by 
law enforcement, or should it be made by the Legislature? 
MR. SNOW: As a personal response? 
MR. ULLMAN: Yes. 
MR. SNOW: I see both sides of the issue, and being a 
former policeman, it was difficult at times to make decisions in 
a fraction of a second when a car is bearing down on you, ahd you 
have to decide whether it's a juvenile or an adult. I think there 
are two sides of the story, and I don't really have a comment on it. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: I'd just like to explore one area with 
you which I'm not, in other words, sure where I'm headed in specif-
ics, but in general there are some questions that have been devel op-
ing in this area in my mind. In Los Angeles we heard from at least 
three representatives of different law enforcement agencies that the 
issue with regard to the use of deadly force really isn't the standard 
so much, if at a l l, as it is with the training, that how deadly force 
gets used in the field depends largely, if not exclusively, upon the 
- -
officer's ability and training a-s opposed to whatever the words are 
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on paper that constitutes a standard, whether we have a Kortnm 
standard or whether we have what we currently have. 
First of all, do you think that is generally right? 
Or do you think that there is more to the standard in the midst of 
standards and training? What would you view as predominate and to 
what extent, and are you able to make any general comments about? 
MR. SNOW: I think attitudes have a tremendous impact. 
Attitudes which are shaped by not only the kind of people that we're 
bringing into law enforcement these days, but by the training. Our 
training has evolved a lot which may impact upon the use of deadly 
force, also, in that we have become far more humanistic in the 
kind of training we're providing. We spent over $1 million on a 
training program to update training concerning the role of a peace 
officer and getting along with people and the community, and this 
was known as Project Star which has become national in scope now, 
and this has shaped our training program, and it shaped the selec-
tion of peace officers. I really believe that there are three 
things that shape whether deadly force is used, the attitude, and the 
caliber of an officer, the law, and the department's policy. All 
three of those have equal impact in the use of deadly force. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Now, as I understood your prior testi-
mony, if the law were to change, the training would change, and the 
training would become more sophisticated or complex, or detailed. 
MR. SNOW: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: I wonder then if another reason to 
consider a change in the law, and I don't know if this would be a 
logical conclusion, I'd be curious as to whether you think it is, 
is that through that type of a change we would then have another 
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incentive for the training to get stiffer or tougher, which the 
training might not otherwise do if the law stays the same. 
MR. SNOW: we•re currently in the process of increasing our 
training requirement. We have historically had, since 1964, a 200 
hour training requirement. Now, in January, the Commission will con-
sider a proposal and we have reason to believe that they will doUble 
that to 400 hours. That is the minimum. In reality, the average 
training time now in law enforcement is about 550 hours, and that•s 
something like 14 or 15 weeks of instruction which is -- we view as 
improvement. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE: Thank you very much for taking the 
time to testify. 
MR. SNOW: I 1 ll send that to you too. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE: Good, thanks a lot. Our final wit-
ness will be Amitai Schwartz who -- are you speaking for the ACLU 
or are you speaking as a private citizen? 
MR. AMITAI SCHWARTZ: No, I 1 m speaking on behalf of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, as well as a number of other groups. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Good. Proceed. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you very much. First of all, let me 
apologize for holding up the Committee. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: It is not at all your falut, you were 
scheduled on our formal agenda for 3:00 pm so you are an hour early. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I would have liked to have come earlier but 
I was attending a banquet where I was one of the honorees and it 
would have been impolite to walk out. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Congratulations. 
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MR. SCHWARTZ: I'm the Legal Director of the Northern 
California Police Practices Project, which is a joint project of the 
American Civil Liberties Union and the Mexican-American Legal Defense 
Fund and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. I've been the Director of 
that Project for over four years and our principal concern is with 
police abuses of power and furthering police accountability in the 
manner in which they deal with citizens. We do that in two ways, we 
litigate when that becomes necessary. For example, our group brought 
and prosecuted the case of Kortum vs. Alkire, which I presume pre-
cipitated these hearings. 
We prosecuted that on behalf of a number of mock taxpayers 
because we saw the deadly force problem as one that was resolvable 
by the courts. 
Secondly, we try to negotiate and work with police depart-
ments as best we can, and in many circumstances we've been able to 
do that. We worked at great length with the Vallejo Police Depart-
ment when Bill Garlington was its Chief of Police. We worked with 
the San Francisco Police Department and we've worked with others in 
a non-adversary capacity trying to assist the departments in develop-
ing regulations governing contacts with citizens. 
One of the principal issues that has come into our office 
over the four years that we have been in existence is police use of 
deadly force generally. It is situations of police use of deadly 
force and probably the most the most serious and critical police 
issues facing minority communities in particular, and all other 
communities in California. There is, at least in my personal exper-
ience as Director of this project, there is nothing like a policeman 
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shooting, whether the officer be right or wrong in the particular 
circumstance, that quite triggers the feeling and the hurt for both 
the officer and the community. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE: Excuse me for one moment. Mr. Jensen 
would like to interrupt. 
MR. JENSEN: I wonder if you'd elaborate on that. We've 
taken testimony before that said this is a very infrequent problem; 
that considering the number of arrests, the use of deadly force is 
miniscule compared to the number of assaults on peace officers; but 
yet, you're saying it is a prevalent problem. Is it symbolically 
a problem, or a real one? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: It's in part symbolic and it's in part in 
actuality. I'm suggesting that the symbolism that revolves around 
any of these events when it happens, such as in Oakland, there have 
been a number of recent incidents of police killing suspects and 
I'm not prejudging whether those were justified or not, I'm just 
saying that they happened. Symbolically, that represents to many 
minority communities, particularly Black and Latino communities, 
the tip of the iceberg in terms of many of the other problems with 
the police. But as a factual matter, the Bureau of Criminal Statis-
tics did a study in 1973 for this committee, I believe, where they 
went through every single death that had occurred as a result of 
police use of deadly force in California over the past two years, 
I don't remember the exact number but think it was somewhere between 
90 and 100 per year. That's 90 and 100 people killed and in some of 
those cases it was likely justified and in some of the cases it 
wasn't, either as a matter of fact or as a matter of law, but it's 
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not something that's susceptible to quantification, because when you 
lose a life, when you extinguish a life in a situation when it's not 
justified, it's something that the Legislature and the courts and 
each and every one of us have to consider very, very seriously. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE: Mr. Jensen. 
MR. JENSEN: Could I ask you a question? What do you mean 
by not justified? Could that--I think that's sort of begging the 
issue. Are you talking about the killings where it was just obviously 
a willful act that is not justified under the current law, or not 
justified under what should be current policy? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: You're absolutely correct, I am begging the 
question: I was hoping to get to it and you gave me the opportunity. 
Well, there are two senses in which I use the word not justified. 
One is not justified as a matter of fact. There have been a number 
of incidents in the Bay Area within the last couple of years that have 
come to our attention where the police officers in stopping a suspect, 
or attempting to apprehend a suspect, handled the firearms in a reck-
less manner. The principal incident that comes to mind was the situ-
ation in San Jose with the San Jose Sheriff's Department some three 
years ago where a Black man was stopped on a warrant check and after 
being pulled out of the car and spread-eagled against the car, one 
of the officers put a gun to his head while he was frisking him with 
the other hand and meantime there were other police officers standing 
around with guns drawn. What happened was the gun went off, and we 
looked into the facts very carefully and it wasn't our belief that 
it was an intentional shooting. It was, in fact, an accidental 
shooting. 
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But on the other hand, it would not have happened had the 
gun been handled in a more appropriate manner and had the gun been 
reholstered and the other officers covered the suspect during the 
time that he was being frisked. So I'm suggesting that that sort 
of a killing, whether or not it's justified by the Penal Code as 
an unintentional act, is unjustified as a matter of fact or as a 
matter of policy. 
The second area deals with the legal justifications for 
use of deadly force, and as this committee most likely knows, that 
area is presently in flux. The Penal Code, on its face, and the 
Penal Code, Section 1963 was enacted in 1872, a hundred and five 
years ago, so that the police can use deadly force in attempting 
to apprehend any felon who is fleeing from arrest. 
The First District Court of Appeal interpreted that term 
11 any felon .. in the case of Kortum vs. Alcari to mean any violent 
felon, to bring it into standards of contemporary times rather than 
the time of 1872. That issue is presently before the California 
Supreme Court and is likely to be resolved early next year in a 
case called Peterson vs. City of Long Beach. It's our position, 
' ' 
the organizations that I represent, certainly the taxpayers that 
we represented in the .Kortum case, that Penal Code Section 1963 
can no longer be read literally, that the Kortum court was absolutely 
correct in its interpretation of the Penal Code as a matter of law 
and that the Constitution of both the State of California and the 
United States compelled the result that was reached in the Kortum 
case. 
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So, when I talk about justifiable homicide, I mean one--
the position we take is a homicide is justified because the lethal 
force was used in circumstances where there was a danger to the 
officer, a danger to life, or serious bodily harm; or there was a 
danger to others, a danger to life or serious bodily harm. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE: Let me just ask a question please. 
Did you argue in Kortum that when the Legislature drafted the 1872 
statute that the legislative intent was that felony didn't really 
mean felony but it meant violent felony? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: No we didn't. We did not argue from the 
standpoint of what legislative intent was in 1872. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE: What was your theory that got you 
to the definition of--the restricted definition of felony? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Well what we suggested was that in 1872 
there were, under the common law, there were only a number of 
offenses categorized as felonies. All except, I think, mayhem 
were punishable by death. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE: May I just ask you, were those offen-
ses violent crimes or were some of them non-violent crimes? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: No, they weren't. Every one of them was 
violent, with the exception of treason, I believe. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE: So felony in 1872 meant basically a 
narrower list of what was, other than treason, violent criminal 
acts. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: That's correct. The origin is of the 
common law growing out of England; but I can't tell you precisely. 
Obviously, there were other felonies in 1872, because much of the 
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present Penal Code defining offenses was also passed in 1872; but 
I'm saying that back in those times, they were rough and ready 
times, and to be a suspected felon was as good as being a dead one 
in many cases. 
The 1872 rule made some sense, but we argued what was good 
in 1872 has totally outlived its usefulness for contemporary times, 
and the reason for that is--there are a great many reasons, but one 
is that the Legislature establishes new crimes all the time, or 
raises certain offenses from misdemeanor to a fel6ny, sometimes 
based on the violent character of the crime, sometimes not. But 
I think it's fair to say that the Legislature, when it categorizes 
an offense as a felony does not consider that in terms of whether 
the police officer is going to shoot somebody and kill them in the 
course of apprehending them. Likewise, the justifications for the 
1872 rule just evaporate upon inspection. Th~ reasons why killing 
a person makes sense, if they have not committed a violent crime 
and if they present no immediate threat to anyone ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE: What about the argument that we've 
heard both today and Monday that you have a burglar who has not, 
at least to the knowledge of the police officer who is trying to 
apprehend him at the time, used violence, but although the officer 
didn't realize it, this burglar also committed a homicide and did 
some other terrible things that did involve violence and if you 
don't have the leeway of getting him with the 1872 statute, you 
may lose somebody who you don't know at the time really is somebody 
who has committed violent criminal behavior, and you've got to have 
the opportunity to apprehend them-with deadly force. 
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MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, let me answer it in two ways. First 
of all, I think it's completely unjustified to allow a police officer 
to make a split second decision as to whether to take someone's life 
on the basis of speculative facts in that there is a possibility 
that this suspect may have done something worse than what we're 
apprehending him for. I think the Los Angeles Police Commission 
regulations, which were recently passed, provide specifically that 
you can't justify a death by something that came after--something 
you found out afterward. You have to take the facts as you find 
them. 
Secondly, I think that in this time with increased police 
communications equipment, with mutual aid compacts between cities, 
it's unrealistic to assume that every person who is suspected of 
committing a felony and then escapes will permanently evade appre-
hension. I think you're assuming too much and in a sense I think 
our police are better than that. I think they can do the job. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE: What if the police don't know whether 
the person they're going after does or does not have a gun and did 
or did not commit a crime with violence but, you know, may have but 
they just don't know? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, the answer to the question really 
depends on the circumstances. I'm not advocating that any police 
officer ought to take any unreasonable risk. If the circumstances 
apparent to a reasonable police officer lead him to fear for his 
life or that there might be harm, then I think it's appropriate to 
have the gun ready. But without examining the circumstances, it's 
impossible to say. Obviously, if you get stopped for a traffic 
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offense on the way out of this auditorium, I think you would probably 
be offended and scared if the officer put a gun through the window 
in the course of telling you to get out. 
On the other hand, if he had some objective information 
which led him to believe that you were a danger, it might make more 
sense. 
Let me just take one more minute to answer the question 
about burglary. Chief Gain, when he was Chief in Oakland, changed 
his department's policy back in 1968 with regard to fleeing burglars, 
in particular, in not using firearms to apprehend the fleeing burglar 
unless there was an indication of violence or a risk to the officer 
! 
or others, and this is the way he justified this policy. He said: 
11 Considering that only 7.65% of all adult burglars arrested, and 
only .28% of all juvenile burglarsarrested are eventually incar-
cerated, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the use of 
deadly force by peace officers to apprehend burglars cannot con-
ceivably be justified. For adults, the police would have to shoot 
100 burglars in order to have captured the eight who would have gone 
to prison. For juveniles, the police would have had to shoot 1,000 
burglam in order to have captured the three who would have gone to 
the Youth Authority... That was one of the justifications given back 
in 1968 in connection with the problem of burglary. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE: Did you have a question? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Obviously at the bottom of all of this is 
the question of whether human life is so dear to us, as it is, that 
we can justify taking the life of a suspected person on the more 
probably cause belief that the person h~s committed a felony in 
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the course of attempting to apprehend that person. Traditionally, 
and under the common law, it was the rule that deadly force is never 
justified in attempting to apprehend a fleeing misdemeanant, and that 
was the law in 1872~ but the dichotomy now between felonies and mis-
demeanors is so fuzzy, in many cases, and there are so many nonviolent 
sorts of crime~ for example, voter fraud, certain forms of voter fraud 
are felonies. And you may recall that about two years ago there was 
quite a hullabaloo in San Francisco about various police officers, 
firemen, and other city officials voting in the city elections even 
though they lived outside the city, and some of those people were 
charged with--initially, with certain forms of felony voter fraud. 
Well, under the rule, as some officers interpret it and as the 
Legislature wrote it in 1872, if some of those voter fraud suspects 
had attempted to flee, and the police attempted to apprehend them 
and felt that it was necessary to shoot, it would have been justi-
fied. I don't think that rule makes any sense and !·don't think 
it's the kind of rule that the police need in order to do their job 
effectively. 
Secondly, the section of the Penal Code, Section 17 ~) 
which defines what a felony is and generally says it's any offense 
which is punishable for more than a year, or punishable in the state 
prison, also says that there are certain sorts of offenses which 
are commonly called wobblers which you don't determine whether they 
are felonies or misdemeanors until after the district attorney has 
filed an information and the judge has given consideration to the 
various circumstances and then the court decides in the deliberation 
of a courtroom with full due process for both sides whether it's a 
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misdemeanor or a felony. And if you contrast that to the situation 
on the streets where you have a police officer with a deadly weapon 
making the determination on the spot with regard to what is a felony 
and what is a misdemeanor and whether force is justified •.• 
MR. ULLMAN: Mr. Schwartz, do you have any idea what the 
percentage of arrests that are booked as felonies result in con-
victions as felonies? Do you have an idea what ••• 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I don't know offhand. 
MR. ULLMAN: I think it's astoundingly small. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: It is because, and I think the Bureau of 
Criminal Statistics could give us an answer relatively quick, but 
you know, with the number of dismissals for lack of evidence, or 
whatever, and the number of dismissals for police practices that 
violate the Fourth Amendment or certain state statutes, and then 
when you get into the plea bargaining situation, and then you get 
into the judge's discretion as to what kind of sentence he's going 
to give, I think the number of felonies, and especially when you 
start looking at the area of nonviolent felonies, that actually re-
sult in convictions and incarceration, I think it would be quite 
revealing, but I don't have the statistics on the top of my head. 
The final conclusion to this portion is that we all have 
to recognize this goes into the plea bargaining situation and the 
way the courts work generally is that it's impossible for any police 
department to prosecute all persons that they have probable cause 
to believe have committed felonies. It happens all the time that 
the police, as they should do, make selective decisions as to what 
- . . 
their priorities are. What are their priorities in a particular 
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community? The priorities in Los Angeles County might be a little 
different than the priorities in the City of Pleasant Hills, a 
suburb of San Francisco. And the police are given the discretion 
to make those selective decisions as to priorities. And we support 
that: but at the same time, one has to recognize that there are 
certain sorts of offenses which are either defined as misdemeanors 
or felonies that go unprosecuted. To allow the police to make the 
snap judgment that it's worth taking a human life in the situation 
of a nonviolent felony in order to prevent the person from escaping, 
I think is, again, giving the police much too much power to exer-
cise in those situations. Now, you know, I've put great stress on 
the fleeing felon rule and that's what I intend to underscore be-
cause what I'm not suggesting is that there isn't a role for firearms 
in self-defense and where serious bodily harm is threatened. That 
obviously makes sense and it's obviously justified. 
The second area that I want to suggest is on the whole 
area of drawing firearms and intimidating behavior with firearms. 
It's something that I suspect is not easily resolvable by the 
Legislature, but I want to bring it to your attention. The question 
was asked of me earlier, how many of these instances actually occur? 
Well, if you count the number of people who actually die, you know, 
it's maybe 100, 110, 125 in a year, but then you also have to ask, 
how many people are threatened or how many officers draw guns in 
situations where an accident could have occurred in that same sort 
of situation that I suggested happened in San Jose~ And you know, 
I remember a conversation I had with Bill Garlington about three 
years ago about the Vallejo Police Department, and he said, we tell 
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our officers to keep the gun in the holster unless you're going to 
use it, and if you have cause to believe you might have to use it 
but you're not sure, then you take the gun out of the holster and 
you point it toward the ground and you have your finger on the 
trigger, but you don't point it at the guy's head unless it becomes 
apparent that the circumstances justify the firing of that gun: and 
I think the Los Angeles Police Commission attempted to deal with 
this problem specifically. Time and time again, we're contacted 
by persons who run into situations where the police, certain police 
officers, and they're definitely a minority, use the weapon as a 
means of intimidation and as a means of authority. We've had situ-
ations where police come to the door of a home and the resident says, 
do you have a warrant? And he pulls out a gun and says, this is my 
warrant. Things like that can't be tolerated, and on local levels 
there really is a responsibility of the chief of police and the 
sheriff to control that sort of thing, but I think that especially 
with regard to Penal Code Section 417, dealing with brandishing 
firearms, it's not clear whether that applies to peace officers or 
just private citizens. 
But there is some area to look into, the local intentional 
intimidation by use of a gun and it's something that I suggest happens 
more frequently than one would suspect by the number of deaths. 
Finally, there's the area of investigation in shooting 
cases. One of the major problems that I've noted, for minority 
communities in particular, is that they just don't have the informa-
tion and they're just not leveled with by law enforcement officials, 
by -some law en~orcement officia1s, ~1th regard to whether a - particular 
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shooting was justified or not justified, and when you lose someone 
you love or a noted community person, the immediate response is that 
the person was killed by the police and there was not good reason 
for it. And the police feed that paranoia by refusing to make pUblic 
any of the information that they gather in their investigations and 
refusing to come forward and be honest about it. 
I have seen situations where the police were quite up front 
about precisely what happened, giving reports, district attorneys 
giving reports as to the progress they were taking in the cases, 
and I think it went a long way to alleviate a good deal of the sus-
picion and a good deal of the problems that are often generated by 
these shootings. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LEVINE: What about the argument that you don't 
want to cause the offending officer, in the course of an investigation, 
to be prejudged, or that you don't want to drag his name out in pUblic 
while the investigation is still proceeding, if there is an investi-
gation? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, I understand that concern and I think 
it's a serious one and it's a balance that has to be struck and has 
to be struck carefully. I think, particularly with the rights of the 
police officer as a criminal suspect, I think those have to be invo-
late. 
And secondly, because I think anytime that a police officer 
pulls a trigger and kills someone, it's going to bring tremendous 
sorrow and remorse. 
But I think there is a way to give out information without 
necessarily dragging the police officer into something which is both 
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unfair and unjust. The police officer is acting on behalf of the 
department; he's wearing the uniform and using the firearm which is 
issued by the department, and I think the department can take a 
position, and certainly a tentative position, with regard to the 
circumstances, and let the criminal process take its course. If 
the officer is not prosecuted criminally, as most are not, the 
district attorney ought to explain why that decision was made, 
rather than just saying that the officer will not be prosecuted 
and that's the end of it and we didn't do anything wrong and every-
body go home until it happens again. 
I saw this happen in Alameda County . where there was a 
killing of the Union City resident by a Union City police officer, 
and initially the community, the Chicano community in Union City, 
was terribly upset and for good reason, because they believed that 
there was no justification in shooting this particular person. He 
was riding a bicycle after stealing a ham out of a supermarket and 
was shot by a police officer in the course of fleeing with the ham. 
The district attorney investigated that incident, and as far as I 
could tell, did a fairly thorough job of it, and refused to prosecute 
the officer; but at the same time he refused to prosecute the officer, 
he also issued a statement saying we investigated the case, we talked 
to any number of witnesses, we flew witnesses up here from Los Angeles, 
we tracked down various witnesses who were here. He didn't use any 
witnesses'names, and said it was apparent that the suspect had a 
knife, and illustrated why that belief was true. Obviously a state-
ment like that is not going to satisfy everybody, but I think it did 
satisfy some personsbecause it -went into some detail, without 
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revealing names and without giving away the case, of what the facts 
were. And I think the District Attorney and the Grand Jury of Alameda 
County at that time really did a commendable exercise in coming for-
ward, but most police don't do that. 
MR. ULLMAN: Can I ask you for the record, was that the 
Geidon (?) case? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: The what? 
MR. ULLMAN: The Guedon (?) case. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Guidon? 
MR. ULLMAN: Guidon case. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: No, that was not~ It was the case of 
Alberto Teheronez. (?) 
MR. ULLMAN: Could I ask you a couple of other questions? 
Do you feel, number one, that the internal affairs division of a 
police department should be the ones investigating police shootings, 
or police killings and if not, is the district attorney an adequate 
investigator, given the ties with the police department in their 
day to day prosecutions? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think, for the most part, internal affairs 
bureaus of the police departments are definitely not the place to 
make a conclusive investigation of the circumstances surrounding a 
death at the hands of a police officer. District attorneys, I think 
district attorneys can be used profitably provided that the deputies 
who actually do the investigation don't rely exclusively on the find-
ings of the police department but, in fact, do an independent inves-
tigation: and secondly, that the deputy who does the investigation 
is sufficiently removed from the day to day workings of the police 
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department that he can reach an objective judgment. 
San Francisco has worked out an informal procedure between 
the police department and the district attorney's office here with 
regard to how District Attorney Freitas is going to investigate 
po1ice shooting cases. I've been trying a year to get them to do 
it in writing and they keep promising me that it's coming but, in 
fact, they've been doing it informally and it's a standing policy, 
they assure me, if a shooting occurs in San Francisco at the hands 
of a police officer, the district attorney's office is called imme-
diately. The chief assistant district attorney assigns an investi-
gator; the investigator goes to the scene as soon as he or she can 
and begins an independent investigation. The instructions are not 
to get in the way of the police and not to go making accusations 
against the officer, but to get to the scene as soon as possible and 
then to do an independent follow-up investigation with regard to the 
circumstances. 
MR. ULLMAN: Is this fairly common in Bay Area counties, 
or is it just San Francisco? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I don't know that it is common because 
the situation where we've had, and I don't want to mislead the 
committee by saying that I have recent information but at least, 
as of about two years ago Santa Clara County, the district attorney's 
office down there was merely reviewing the investigations done by the 
police and making a judgment on that basis and then presenting the 
case to the grand jury. 
MR. ULLMAN: Do you think there should be some state 
-
legislation mandating district attorney's offices to investigate all 
police shootings or police killings? 
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MR. SCHWARTZ: You know, I think it would be very useful 
and probably the spur that•s necessary to make sure that it works, 
because you•ve got a number of values at stake. One, you•ve got 
the value of preventing an unjustified killing from happening again. 
Secondly, you•ve got the whole value of the criminal law, that people 
who commit crimes ought not to be treated differently because of 
their class or character and that police officers commit crimes, as 
most don•t~ but when they do that the situation ought to be inves-
tigated and looked into the same way it is if you or I commit a 
crime. 
And third is the whole question of the kind of information 
that•s going to be given to the community and whether the people who 
are served by the municipal service known as policing, whether they 
will accept the findings of the police department or the district 
attorney•s office which merely says that the killing was justified 
and that•s the end of it. There has to be openness. This Legislature 
has recognized time and time again, in the Brown Act and in the PUblic 
Records Act and in various other kinds of sunshine laws, that openness 
really leads to honesty and leads to confidence on the part of citizens: 
and I think the Legislature can go a long way in this particular area, 
precisely because in some sense it•s a symbol, and in some sense be-
cause we are talking about human lives. 
I 1 ll conclude unless the Committee has further questions. 
MR. ULLMAN: Yes, Mr. Jensen has a question and I do, right 
at this point. 
MR. JENSEN: You want to go ahead? 
MR. ULLMAN: No, go ahead. 
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MR. JENSEN: I have a couple of questions. I wonder if 
you would elaborate a little bit about the basis of your constitu-
tional challenge to the broad ruling of justifiable homicide. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, it's difficult to do briefly. I'd 
be happy to make a copy of the brief we filed in the Peterson case ••• 
MR. JENSEN: Maybe that would be simplest. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: ••• available to you, but generally, the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable force in the apprehension 
of a suspect and the rule which authorizes police to use lethal 
force is unreasonable for a variety of reasons which I've alluded 
to some and I haven't others. 
And the other right atstake is the right not to be deprived 
of life without a trial. Not even a judge can summarily take action 
in his courtroom in terms of contempt unless the contempt directly 
interferes and is immediately necessary to preserve the function 
of the court, so to give the police officer the right to take a life 
on the mere probable cause belief that the person has comitted any 
felony violates due process. 
MR. JENSEN: I have a second question and we haven't dis-
cussed this, or at least you haven't discussed this. It's been 
suggested at least once that the concern of law enforcement was 
with the criminal liability that might flow from the restricted 
reading of when they make a reasonable mistake. For instance, the 
criminal liability that might flow from a narrow statute would pose 
an extreme problem with them and dissuade them from vigorously pur-
suing their duty; whereas they were not concerned necessarily with 
- . 
the civil liability that might flow from a reasonable- mistake~ -
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Have you given any thought to the idea of bifurcating this? In 
other words, saying that we will expand or narrow the term "reasonable 
force" when we're talking about civil liability but not when we're 
talking about criminal liability. 
Well, let me just elaborate on that for one second. It's 
the area that I wanted to get into. Short of the issue of bifurca-
tion, how do you feel about the concern that if somebody is faced 
with a split second decision, as a law enforcement officer is in 
these situations, and they end up making the wrong decision, they 
do have criminal liability, should they or shouldn't they? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, the question of liability, I guess, 
the way you're using the term, is the person possibly sUbject to 
criminal sanctions ••• 
MR. JENSEN: Right. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: ••• because I think in the examples you're 
giving me, if it's an accident or if there is a group faith and 
belief, then it's no longer an intentional violation and therefore 
would not necessarily lead to criminal liability. 
MR. JENSEN: Well still, you get questions of theft which 
gets read differently by different people and the officer insists 
that he had a good faith belief and the jury concludes that it 
wasn't reasonably held, and then he's prosecuted and convicted. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, that's why we have the jury system, 
and we're all sUbject to those sort of concerns when we, in our 
daily lives -- I'm not convinced, at least, that the police hold a 
special case, especially when it's in regard to this nonviolent 
killing situation. With this nonviolent killing situation, I mean 
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if an officer can point to circumstances that lead him or her to 
be1ieve that the subject is armed or that it was a dangerous felony, 
then you don't have a problem. I think it depends more, for me at 
1east, and I understand that many representatives of law enforcement 
are saying, it probably depends on how the statute is worded, and 
I think if you make the statute precise enough and the Legislature 
is careful about, as it should be whenever it defines an offense or 
a justification for an offense, that you're going to get rid of most 
of these problems, but if you just use the term violent felony, you 
know, then you've got some other problems, but you see, right now 
I think that the police department themselves can begin to rectify 
some of those problems by giving careful considerate instructions, 
both in terms of training and guidelines. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Have you tried your hand at drafting a 
statute in this area? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: No, I have not. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Would you be interested in doing so? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I may be. I'd like to see what the Supreme 
Court does in the Peterson case, and then, depending on the result ••• 
CSAIRMAN LEVINE: If you do have a specific thought as to 
a statute that you would suggest, I'd be interested in it sometime 
in the next several months. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: I'd be happy to do that and, in fact, just 
recently we had a law student at our office go through the codes of 
all fifty states and collect the existing statutes on justifiable 
homicide, and I'll be happy to make those available to the Committee. 
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MR. JENSEN: I'd be particularly interested in sort of the 
range: What the toughest are, the most lenient, and where we fit, 
basically. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, where we presently fit is in the dark 
ages in that we follow the old common law of rule, but that is not 
to say that we're alone; but it is to say that many states are be-
ginning to change over from that legislation. 
MR. ULLMAN: Could I explore that with you? You say we are 
in the dark ages as far as the statute is concerned, but aren't we 
sort of in a progressive age as far as the police department regu-
lations are concerned generally? Don't most, if not nearly all 
police departments, have pretty restrictive gun use policies that 
are on paper? 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, many of them do. And as far as I've 
been able to tell recently, the major California departments do. I 
don't know about the Highway Patrol, but the major departments do. 
But part of the problem is enforcement of those local regulations. 
In the Peterson case, the City of Long Beach had a regulations saying, 
thou shalt not shoot in this situation, and the shooting occurred 
anyway. So I think what's indicated by the fact that many of the 
major police departments already have their own administrative rules 
saying this is that -- the police can live without, because they've 
said it. They've said it to their own people, and they've said that 
we've administratively made a policy saying that we don't want you 
shooting in these situations. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Mr. Schwartz, thank you very much for 
your testimony and your help and I would be interested in staying 
in touch with regard to possible developments in the law. 
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MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you very much, and I'll make that 
summary of the other states' statutes available to the Committee, 
hopefully right after the new year. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: Thank you. 
MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN LEVINE: With this testimony, we will conclude 
our hearings on the use of deadly force by law enforcement by the 
joint sUbcommittees for the interim session. Thank you. 
######## 
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